Artikel

Profits and losses from changes in fair value, executive cash compensation and managerial power: Evidence from A-share listed companies in China

According to optimal contracting theory, compensation contracts are effective in solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers. Executive compensation is naturally related to firm performance. However, contracts are not always perfect. Managers may exert influence on the formulation and implementation of compensation contracts by means of their managerial power. As fair value has been introduced into the new accounting standards in China, new concerns have arisen over the relationship between profits and losses from changes in fair value (CFV) and levels of executive compensation. In this study, we find that executive compensation is significantly related to CFV. However, this sensitivity is asymmetric in that increases to compensation due to profits from changes in fair value (PCFV) are higher than reductions to compensation due to losses from changes in fair value (LCFV). Furthermore, we find that managerial power determines the strength of this asymmetry.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: China Journal of Accounting Research ; ISSN: 1755-3091 ; Volume: 5 ; Year: 2012 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 269-292 ; Amsterdam: Elsevier

Klassifikation
Management
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Accounting and Auditing: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
Profits and losses from changes in fair value
Executive compensation
Managerial power

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Shao, Ruiqing
Chen, Chunhua
Mao, Xiangzu
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Elsevier
(wo)
Amsterdam
(wann)
2012

DOI
doi:10.1016/j.cjar.2012.11.002
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Shao, Ruiqing
  • Chen, Chunhua
  • Mao, Xiangzu
  • Elsevier

Entstanden

  • 2012

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