Hochschulschrift
On negatively interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Dortmund, Techn. Univ., Diss., 2010
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Keyword
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Rent Seeking
Wettbewerb
Spieltheorie
Nutzen
Harzburger Modell
Interessenvertretung
- Creator
- Handle
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2003/27249
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:hbz:290-2003/27249-3
- Rights
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Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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25.03.2025, 1:54 PM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Hochschulschrift
Associated
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