Evolutionarily stable preferences in contests

Arbeitspapier

We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that the indirect evolutionary approach yields the same more aggressive behavior, too. This holds for any population size N, if evolution of preferences is determined by behavior in two-player contests. The evolutionarily stable preferences (ESP) of the indirect approach turn out to be negatively interdependent, thereby ”rationalizing” the more aggressive behavior.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2343

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Thema: Contests ; preference evolution ; evolutionary stability ; Rent Seeking ; Wettbewerb ; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie ; Präferenztheorie ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Leininger, Wolfgang
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26388
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ