Arbeitspapier

Distribution of wealth and interdependent preferences

We examine the socially optimal wealth distribution in a two-person two-good model with heterogeneous workers and asymmetric social interactions where only one (social) individual derives positive or negative utility from the leisure of the other (non-social) individual. We show that the interdependence can effectively counter-act the need to transfer wealth to low-wage individuals and may require them to be poorer by all objective measures. We demonstrate that in the presence of social interactions it can be socially desirable to keep substantial wealth inequality.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3684

Classification
Wirtschaft
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Subject
Wealth inequality
earnings inequality
social welfare
social interactions
Vermögensverteilung
Einkommensverteilung
Soziale Beziehungen
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Grodner, Andrew
Kniesner, Thomas J.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2008

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008100821
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Grodner, Andrew
  • Kniesner, Thomas J.
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2008

Other Objects (12)