Arbeitspapier
The (de)composition of firms: interdependent preferences of corporate actors
This article discusses the limitations of the orthodox economic theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts. Various experimental studies have shown that the aggregation of individuals in groups changes behavior and preferences systematically. This perspective has been formalized by models of interdependent preferences. Based on a prominent approach of interdependent preferences, intention-based preferences, two types of labor contracts, incentive contracts and bonus contracts, are analyzed. Results are compared with the predictions of the orthodox economic theory.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2007,21
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
- Thema
-
Firms
interdependent preferences
labor contracts
Theorie der Unternehmung
Arbeitsvertrag
Nutzen
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nicklisch, Andreas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Nicklisch, Andreas
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2007
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