Implementation with interdependent valuations

Artikel

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to truthfully reveal his type when faced with VCG payments. We show that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to the VCG transfers that restore incentive compatibility. We further show that truthful revelation is an approximate ex post equilibrium. Lastly, we show that in replicated settings aggregate payments sufficient to induce truthful revelation go to zero.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 923-952 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Auctions ; Welfare Economics: General ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: Auctions ; incentive compatibility ; mechanism design ; interdependent values ; ex post incentive compatibility

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Postlewaite, Andrew ; McLean, Richard
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Econometric Society
• (wo): New Haven, CT
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE1440
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150268
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ