Symmetric play in repeated allocation games

Arbeitspapier

We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually rational set. We also provide a theory of how rational individuals play these games, identifying particular strategies as focal through the considerations of Pareto optimality and simplicity. We report experiments that support many aspects of this theory.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1551

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: symmetry ; repeated games ; focal points ; experiments ; symmetry ; repeated games ; focal points ; experiments

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kuzmics, Christoph ; Palfrey, Thomas ; Rogers, Brian W.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97245
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET