Job-Search Periods for Welfare Applicants: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies mandatory job-search periods for welfare applicants. During this period the benefits application is put on hold and the applicant is obliged to make job applications. We combine a randomized experiment with detailed administrative data to investigate the effects of imposing a job-search period. We find strong and persistent effects on the probability to collect welfare benefits. The reduced benefits are fully compensated by increased earnings from work. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of adverse consequences for the most vulnerable applicants. Our results therefore suggest that a job-search period is an effective instrument for targeting welfare-benefits applicants.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 9786

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions ; Field Experiments ; Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; Labor Economics Policies
• Thema: job search ; welfare-to-work ; active labor-market policies ; randomized experiment

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bolhaar, Jonneke ; Ketel, Nadine ; van der Klaauw, Bas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/141545
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ