Arbeitspapier
Ranking of job applicants, on-the-job search, and persistent unemployment
We formulate an efficiency wage model with on-the-job search where wages depend on turnover and employers may use information on whether the searching worker is employed or unemployed as a hiring criterion. We show theoretically that ranking of job applicants by employment status affects both the level and the persistence of unemployment and numerically that these effects may be substantial. More prevalent ranking in Europe compared to the US (because of more rigid wage structures etc.) could potentially help to explain the high and persistent unemployment in Europe.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2000:8
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- Thema
-
Efficiency wage
Turnover
On-the-job search
Labor mobility
Persistence
Ranking
Unemployment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Eriksson, Stefan
Gottfries, Nils
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)
- (wo)
-
Uppsala
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Eriksson, Stefan
- Gottfries, Nils
- Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)
Entstanden
- 2000
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