Arbeitspapier

Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-emption, voracity and exhaustion

We extend Fujiwara's (2008) model to describe a differential oligopoly game of resource extraction under static, linear feedback and nonlinear feedback strategies, generalising his result that steady state feedback outputs are lower than monopoly and static oligopoly equilibrium outputs for any number of firms. Additionally, we show that (i) feedback rules entail resource exhaustion for a finite number of firms; and (ii) feedback strategies are more aggressive than static ones as long as the resource stock is large enough, in accordance with the acquired view based on the traditional pre-emption argument associated with feedback information.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 890

Classification
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2013

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3709
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Mantovani, Andrea
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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