Arbeitspapier

On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly

This paper offers an overview of the literature discussing oligopoly games in which polluti ng emissions are generated by the supply of goods requiring a natural resource as an input. An analytical summary of the main features of the interplay between pollution and resource extraction is then given using a differential game based on the Cournot oligopoly model, in which (i) the bearings on resource preservation of Pigouvian tax rate tailored on emissions are singled out and (ii) the issue of the optimal number of firms in the commons is also addressed.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 976

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lambertini, Luca
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(wo)
Bologna
(wann)
2014

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4101
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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