Exploration for Nonrenewable Resources in a Dynamic Oligopoly: An Arrovian Result

Arbeitspapier

I investigate two versions of a differential Cournot oligopoly game with nonrenewable resource exploitation, in which each firm may either exploit its own private pool or exploit a common pool jointly with the rivals. Firms use a deterministic technology to invest in exploration activities. In both models, there emerges that (i) the individual exploration effort is higher when each firms has exclusive rights on a pool of its own, and (ii) depending on the assumptions on technology and demand, the aggregate exploration effort is either constant or increasing in the number of firms.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 859

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: General

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lambertini, Luca
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
• (where): Bologna
• (when): 2013

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3683
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159698