Opinion leaders, influence activities and leadership rents

Arbeitspapier

Consumers may observe previous consumers’ choices. They may follow their choices if they think these consumers are better informed. In turn, firms may concentrate on influencing the early consumers. This, in turn, changes the nature of early consumers’ choice behavior as a signal for other consumers. In this paper, I show that firms’ influence activities need not distort earlier consumers’ decisions, but may reduce the informative value of these decisions for other consumers if influence activities are noisy or if some firms have deep pockets and others are liquidity constrained.

Object Details

• Alternative title: Konsumentenbeeinflussung und die Konsumentenrenten von Meinungsführern bei Produktinnovationen
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2003-29

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
• Subject: Opinion leaders ; influence activities ; promotional competition ; leadership ; deep pockets ; liquidity constraints

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Konrad, Kai A.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51132
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET