Arbeitspapier
On the equivalence of the G-weak and -strong core in the marriage problems
In the marriage problem (two-sided one-to-one matching problem), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core and the set of stable matchings are all equivalent. This paper generalizes the above observation considering the G-weak core and the G-strong core. These are core concepts in which blocking power is restricted to the coalitions belonging to the prescribed class of coalitions G. I give a necessary and sufficient condition that G should satisfy for the equivalence of the G-weak core and the G-strong core.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 652
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Subject
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marriage problem
G-weak core
G-strong core
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Takamiya, Koji
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (where)
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Osaka
- (when)
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2006
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Takamiya, Koji
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Time of origin
- 2006