Arbeitspapier
Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core
We consider a pure exchange economy with finitely many indivisible commodities that are available only in integer quantities. We prove that in such an economy with a sufficiently large number of agents, but finitely many agents, the strong core coincides with the set of cost-minimized Walras allocations. Because of the indivisibility, the preference maximization does not imply the cost minimization. A cost-minimized Walras equilibrium is a state where, under some price vector, all agents satisfy both the preference maximization and the cost minimization.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Papers ; No. 417
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Exchange and Production Economies
- Thema
-
Indivisible commodities
Strong core
Cost-minimized Walras equilibrium
Core equivalence
Gleichgewichtstheorie
Core
Marktmechanismus
Unteilbarkeit
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Inoue, Tomoki
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-14901
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Inoue, Tomoki
- Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Entstanden
- 2009