Arbeitspapier

Heterogeneity and stability: Bolster the strong, not the weak

This paper provides a model of systemic panic among financial institutions with heterogeneous fragilities. Concerns about potential spillovers from each other generate strategic interaction among institutions, triggering a preemption game in which one tries to exit the market before the others to avoid spillovers. Although financial contagion originates in weaker institutions, systemic risk depends critically on the financial health of stronger institutions in the contagion chain. This analysis suggests that when concerns about spillovers prevail, then 1) increasing heterogeneity of institutions promotes systemic stability and 2) bolstering the strong institutions in the contagion chain, rather than the weak, more effectively enhances systemic stability.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Staff Report ; No. 637

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Economics: General
Financial Crises
Thema
financial spillovers
panic
financial crises

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Choi, Dong Beom
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Choi, Dong Beom
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Entstanden

  • 2013

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