Arbeitspapier
On the equivalence of the G-weak and -strong core in the marriage problems
In the marriage problem (two-sided one-to-one matching problem), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core and the set of stable matchings are all equivalent. This paper generalizes the above observation considering the G-weak core and the G-strong core. These are core concepts in which blocking power is restricted to the coalitions belonging to the prescribed class of coalitions G. I give a necessary and sufficient condition that G should satisfy for the equivalence of the G-weak core and the G-strong core.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 652
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Thema
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marriage problem
G-weak core
G-strong core
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Takamiya, Koji
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Takamiya, Koji
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2006