Arbeitspapier

On the equivalence of the G-weak and -strong core in the marriage problems

In the marriage problem (two-sided one-to-one matching problem), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core and the set of stable matchings are all equivalent. This paper generalizes the above observation considering the G-weak core and the G-strong core. These are core concepts in which blocking power is restricted to the coalitions belonging to the prescribed class of coalitions G. I give a necessary and sufficient condition that G should satisfy for the equivalence of the G-weak core and the G-strong core.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 652

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Thema
marriage problem
G-weak core
G-strong core

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Takamiya, Koji
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Takamiya, Koji
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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