Frictional Assignment

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines efficient and equilibrium allocations in an economy where agents with diverse characteristics are matched through a time-consuming process to produce output. This is cast in a labour market where workers of different skills match with machines of different qualities. The efficient assignment is not always positively assortative and can be decentralized by a competitive mechanism where firms compete by posting wages and committing to the skill that their chosen machines are intended for. Implications on wage inequality are examined.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 988

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Factor Income Distribution ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
• Subject: Matching ; Efficiency ; Frictions ; Skills: Wage inequality

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Shi, Shouyong
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Queen's University, Department of Economics
• (where): Kingston (Ontario)
• (when): 1998

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189278
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET