Social comparison and performance: experimental evidence on the fair wage-effort hypothesis
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Deutsch
- Bibliographic citation
-
IZA discussion papers ; 4687
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Keyword
-
Gehalt
Lohn
Gerechtigkeit
Zwischenmenschliche Beziehung
Leistungsmotivation
Arbeitsproduktivität
Austauschtheorie
Experiment
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (who)
-
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH
- (when)
-
2010
- Creator
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20100126841
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
14.08.2025, 11:02 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Gächter, Simon
- Thöni, Christian
- Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH
Time of origin
- 2010
Other Objects (12)
Social comparison and performance: experimental evidence on the fair wage-effort hypothesis
Social comparison and performance: Experimental evidence on the fair-wage effort hypothesis
Wage dispersion and workers' effort
Fair wages and effort provision: Combining evidence from the lab and the field
Aggregation with a non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages
Aggregation with a non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages
Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply
Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply
Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Incentive ("Fair") Wages
Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Incentive ("Fair") Wages
Efficiency Wages and Effort: Are Hard Jobs Better?
Do Co-Workers? Wages Matter? : Theory and Evidence on Wage Secrecy, Wage Compression and Effort
Social comparison and performance: experimental evidence on the fair wage-effort hypothesis
Social comparison and performance: Experimental evidence on the fair-wage effort hypothesis
Wage dispersion and workers' effort
Fair wages and effort provision: Combining evidence from the lab and the field
Aggregation with a non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages
Aggregation with a non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages
Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply
Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply
Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Incentive ("Fair") Wages
Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Incentive ("Fair") Wages
Efficiency Wages and Effort: Are Hard Jobs Better?
Do Co-Workers? Wages Matter? : Theory and Evidence on Wage Secrecy, Wage Compression and Effort
Social comparison and performance: experimental evidence on the fair wage-effort hypothesis
Social comparison and performance: Experimental evidence on the fair-wage effort hypothesis
Wage dispersion and workers' effort
Fair wages and effort provision: Combining evidence from the lab and the field
Aggregation with a non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages
Aggregation with a non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages
Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply
Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply
Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Incentive ("Fair") Wages
Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Incentive ("Fair") Wages
Efficiency Wages and Effort: Are Hard Jobs Better?