Arbeitspapier
Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply
It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate positive worker rents and, consequently, inefficiently low e?ort. We show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context. The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, ?rms may exploit workers' future rents to induce excessively high effort.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 264
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
bonuses
limited liability
minimum wages
Mindestlohn
Leistungsmotivation
Arbeitsvertrag
Vertragstheorie
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Kräkel, Matthias
Schöttner, Anja
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (where)
-
München
- (when)
-
2009
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13288
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13288-8
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kräkel, Matthias
- Schöttner, Anja
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Time of origin
- 2009