Arbeitspapier

Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply

It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate positive worker rents and, consequently, inefficiently low e?ort. We show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context. The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, ?rms may exploit workers' future rents to induce excessively high effort.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 264

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
bonuses
limited liability
minimum wages
Mindestlohn
Leistungsmotivation
Arbeitsvertrag
Vertragstheorie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kräkel, Matthias
Schöttner, Anja
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2009

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13288
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13288-8
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kräkel, Matthias
  • Schöttner, Anja
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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