Arbeitspapier
Social comparison and performance: experimental evidence on the fair wage-effort hypothesis
We investigate the impact of wage comparisons for worker productivity. We present three studies which all use three-person gift-exchange experiments. Consistent with Akerlof and Yellen's (1990) fair wage-effort hypothesis we find that disadvantageous wage discrimination leads to lower efforts while advantageous wage discrimination does not increase efforts on average. Two studies allow us to measure wage comparison effects at the individual level. We observe strongly heterogeneous wage comparison effects. We also find that reactions to wage discrimination can be attributed to the underlying intentions of discrimination rather than to payoff consequences
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4687
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Labor Discrimination
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Thema
-
Fair wage-effort hypothesis
wage comparison
gift exchange
horizontal fairness
discrimination
Lohn
Gerechtigkeit
Soziale Beziehungen
Leistungsmotivation
Arbeitsproduktivität
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gächter, Simon
Thöni, Christian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gächter, Simon
- Thöni, Christian
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2010
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