Arbeitspapier

Does membership on the UN Security Council influence IMF conditionality?

We investigate whether elected members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), analyzing panel data on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the period of 1992 to 2008. We find a negative relationship: Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions attached to the loans that they receive from the IMF. We conclude that conditionality is softer for these countries because the major shareholders of the IMF desire influence over the Security Council.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 36

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Foreign Aid
Thema
IMF
UN Security Council
Voting
Aid
Conditionality

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dreher, Axel
Sturm, Jan-Egbert
Vreeland, James Raymond
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Courant Research Centre - Poverty, Equity and Growth (CRC-PEG)
(wo)
Göttingen
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dreher, Axel
  • Sturm, Jan-Egbert
  • Vreeland, James Raymond
  • Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Courant Research Centre - Poverty, Equity and Growth (CRC-PEG)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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