Arbeitspapier
The development and implementation of IMF and World Bank conditionality
The paper presents a detailed description of IMF and World Bank conditionality and tries to explain changes in this conditionality over time as well as differences between the two institutions. Using panel data it is shown that the number of Fund conditions seem to be influenced by contemporaneous World Bank activity. Moreover, the paper tries to explain compliance with World Bank conditionality as well as interruptions of IMF programs in the recipient countries. Compliance with World Bank conditionality is lower in election years and pre-election years. Breakdowns of IMF programs are less likely in election years. However, no other political factors seem to influence interruptions and compliance systematically. The paper describes the institutions' reaction to recent criticism and concludes with implications for reform.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: HWWA Discussion Paper ; No. 165
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
International Lending and Debt Problems
World Bank
Conditionality
Compliance
Program Interruption
Anpassungsprogramm des IWF
Entwicklungshilfekonditionen
Geschichte
Public Choice
Schätzung
Welt
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dreher, Axel
- Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA)
Entstanden
- 2002