Arbeitspapier

Do IMF and World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?

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Using panel data for 188 countries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment programs and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the US, World Bank (concessional and non-concessional) loans have a significant impact, while the IMF has not. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and method of estimation.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1724

Classification
Wirtschaft
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
Subject
Wahlverhalten
Anpassungsprogramm des IWF
Internationaler Kredit
Panel

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dreher, Axel
Sturm, Jan-Egbert
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dreher, Axel
  • Sturm, Jan-Egbert
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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