Arbeitspapier
Do IMF and World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?
Using panel data for 188 countries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment programs and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the US, World Bank (concessional and non-concessional) loans have a significant impact, while the IMF has not. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and method of estimation.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1724
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- Thema
-
Wahlverhalten
Anpassungsprogramm des IWF
Internationaler Kredit
Panel
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dreher, Axel
Sturm, Jan-Egbert
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dreher, Axel
- Sturm, Jan-Egbert
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2006