Arbeitspapier
Does membership on the UN security council influence IMF decisions? Evidence from panel data
We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using panel data for 191 countries over the period 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional and country effects, and duration dependence. There is also evidence that UNSC membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The size of the loan, however, is not affected by UNSC membership.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: KOF Working Papers ; No. 151
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- Thema
-
IMF
UN Security Council
Voting
Aid
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dreher, Axel
Sturm, Jan-Egbert
Vreeland, James Raymond
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2006
- DOI
-
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005277576
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dreher, Axel
- Sturm, Jan-Egbert
- Vreeland, James Raymond
- ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute
Entstanden
- 2006