Arbeitspapier

Does membership on the UN security council influence IMF decisions? Evidence from panel data

We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using panel data for 191 countries over the period 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional and country effects, and duration dependence. There is also evidence that UNSC membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The size of the loan, however, is not affected by UNSC membership.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: KOF Working Papers ; No. 151

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
Thema
IMF
UN Security Council
Voting
Aid

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dreher, Axel
Sturm, Jan-Egbert
Vreeland, James Raymond
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2006

DOI
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005277576
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dreher, Axel
  • Sturm, Jan-Egbert
  • Vreeland, James Raymond
  • ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute

Entstanden

  • 2006

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