The development and implementation of IMF and World Bank conditionality

Arbeitspapier

The paper presents a detailed description of IMF and World Bank conditionality and tries to explain changes in this conditionality over time as well as differences between the two institutions. Using panel data it is shown that the number of Fund conditions seem to be influenced by contemporaneous World Bank activity. Moreover, the paper tries to explain compliance with World Bank conditionality as well as interruptions of IMF programs in the recipient countries. Compliance with World Bank conditionality is lower in election years and pre-election years. Breakdowns of IMF programs are less likely in election years. However, no other political factors seem to influence interruptions and compliance systematically. The paper describes the institutions' reaction to recent criticism and concludes with implications for reform.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: HWWA Discussion Paper ; No. 165

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions ; International Lending and Debt Problems
• Subject: IMF ; World Bank ; Conditionality ; Compliance ; Program Interruption ; Anpassungsprogramm des IWF ; Entwicklungshilfekonditionen ; Geschichte ; Public Choice ; Schätzung ; Welt

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dreher, Axel
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA)
• (where): Hamburg
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19327
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET