Arbeitspapier
The impact of referendums on the centralisation of public goods provision: a political economy approach
The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the noncooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1803
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- Thema
-
Öffentliches Gut
Zentralstaat
Zwei-Regionen-Modell
Spillover-Effekt
Demokratie
Public Choice
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schnellenbach, Jan
Feld, Lars P.
Schaltegger, Christoph A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schnellenbach, Jan
- Feld, Lars P.
- Schaltegger, Christoph A.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2006