Arbeitspapier

Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods

According to economists, severe legal sanctions deter violations of the law. According to legal scholars, people may obey law backed by mild sanctions because of norm-activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild and severe legal sanctions in the provision of public goods. The results show that severe sanctions almost perfectly deter free-riding. However, people also obey law backed by mild sanctions if it is accepted in a referendum. We show that voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, and that people tend to obey the law if they expect many others to do so.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 651

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
deterrent effect of legal sanctions
expressive law
social norms
public goods
voting.

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Feld, Lars P.
Tyran, Jean-Robert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Feld, Lars P.
  • Tyran, Jean-Robert
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2002

Ähnliche Objekte (12)