Arbeitspapier

Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods

According to economists, severe legal sanctions deter violations of the law. According to legal scholars, people may obey law backed by mild sanctions because of norm-activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild and severe legal sanctions in the provision of public goods. The results show that severe sanctions almost perfectly deter free-riding. However, people also obey law backed by mild sanctions if it is accepted in a referendum. We show that voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, and that people tend to obey the law if they expect many others to do so.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 651

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
deterrent effect of legal sanctions
expressive law
social norms
public goods
voting.

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Feld, Lars P.
Tyran, Jean-Robert
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Feld, Lars P.
  • Tyran, Jean-Robert
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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