Arbeitspapier

The impact of referendums on the centralisation of public goods provision: a political economy approach

The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the noncooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1803

Classification
Wirtschaft
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Subject
Öffentliches Gut
Zentralstaat
Zwei-Regionen-Modell
Spillover-Effekt
Demokratie
Public Choice
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schnellenbach, Jan
Feld, Lars P.
Schaltegger, Christoph A.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schnellenbach, Jan
  • Feld, Lars P.
  • Schaltegger, Christoph A.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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