Arbeitspapier
Extensive-form level-k thinking
Level-k thinking and Cognitive Hierarchy have been widely applied as a normalform solution concept in behavioral and experimental game theory. We consider the extension of level-k thinking to extensive-form games. Player's may learn about levels of opponents' thinking during the play of the game because some information sets may be inconsistent with certain levels. In particular, for any information set reached, a level-k player attaches the maximum level-l thinking for l < k to her opponents consistent with the information set. We compare extensive-form level-k thinking with other solution concepts such as level-k thinking in the associated normal-form, extensive-form rationalizability, delta-rationalizability, iterated admissibility, and backward induction. We use extensive-form level-k thinking to reanalyze data from some prior experiments in the literature.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 352
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
- Subject
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Level-k thinking
Cognitive hierarchy
Theory-of-Mind
Rationalizability
Iterated admissibility
Extensive-form rationalizability
delta-rationalizability
Mutual belief in rationality
Experimental game theory
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Schipper, Burkhard
Zhou, Hang
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of California, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Davis, CA
- (when)
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2022
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schipper, Burkhard
- Zhou, Hang
- University of California, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2022
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Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games
Is there Always a 'Right' Extensive Form?
Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games
Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
The category of node-and-choice forms for extensive-form games
Convergence of best response dynamics in extensive-form games
Strategie equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games