Arbeitspapier
An Epistemic Characterisation of Extensive Form Rationalisability
We use an extensive form, universal type space to provide the following epistemic characterisation of extensive form rationalisability. Say that player i strongly believes event E if i is certain of E conditional on each of her information sets consistent with E. Our main contribution is to show that a strategy profile s is extensive form rationalisable if and only if there is a state in which s is played and (0) everybody is rational, (1) everybody strongly believes (0), (2) everybody strongly believes (0) & (1), (3) everybody strongly believes (0) & (1) & (2), .... This result also allows us to provide sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome and to relate extensive form rationalisability and conditional common certainty of rationality.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 25.1999
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Rationalisability
Extensive Form Games
Spieltheorie
Wissenschaft
Theorie
Extensives Spiel
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Battigalli, Pierpaolo
Siniscalchi, Marciano
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo
- Siniscalchi, Marciano
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 1999
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Extensive-form level-k thinking
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games
A category for extensive-form games
Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games
Is there Always a 'Right' Extensive Form?
Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games
The category of node-and-choice forms for extensive-form games
Rationality and Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games
Convergence of best response dynamics in extensive-form games
Strategie equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games
Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-Form Games with Unawareness
Extensive-form level-k thinking
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games
A category for extensive-form games
Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games
Is there Always a 'Right' Extensive Form?
Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games
The category of node-and-choice forms for extensive-form games
Rationality and Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games
Convergence of best response dynamics in extensive-form games
Strategie equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games
Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-Form Games with Unawareness
Extensive-form level-k thinking
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games
A category for extensive-form games
Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games
Is there Always a 'Right' Extensive Form?
Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games
The category of node-and-choice forms for extensive-form games
Rationality and Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games
Convergence of best response dynamics in extensive-form games
Strategie equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games