Arbeitspapier
Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-Form Games with Unawareness
We define a cautious version of extensive-form rationalizability for generalized extensive-form games with unawareness that we call prudent rationalizability. It is an extensive-form analogue of iterated admissibility. In each round of the procedure, for each tree and each information set of a player a surviving strategy of hers is required to be rational vis-a-vis a belief system with a full-support belief on the opponents' previously surviving strategies that reach that information set. We demonstrate the applicability of prudent rationalizability. In games of disclosure of verifiable information, we show that prudent rationalizability yields unraveling under full awareness but unraveling might fail under unawareness. We compare prudent rationalizability to extensive-form rationalizability. We show that prudent rationalizability may not refine extensive-form rationalizability strategies but conjecture that the paths induced by prudent rationalizable strategy profiles (weakly) refine the set of paths induced by extensive-form rationalizable strategies.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 332
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Subject
-
Caution
extensive-form rationalizability
unawareness
disclosure
verifiable information
persuasion games
iterated admissibility
common strong cautious belief in rationality
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Heifetz, Aviad
Meier, Martin
Schipper, Burkhard
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of California, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Davis, CA
- (when)
-
2019
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Heifetz, Aviad
- Meier, Martin
- Schipper, Burkhard
- University of California, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2019
Other Objects (12)
Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games
Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-form Games with Unawareness
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games
A category for extensive-form games
The theory of extensive form games
Consistent beliefs in extensive form games
Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games
Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Rationality and Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games
Convergence of best response dynamics in extensive-form games
Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games
Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-form Games with Unawareness
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games
A category for extensive-form games
The theory of extensive form games
Consistent beliefs in extensive form games
Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games
Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Rationality and Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games
Convergence of best response dynamics in extensive-form games
Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games
Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-form Games with Unawareness
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games
A category for extensive-form games
The theory of extensive form games
Consistent beliefs in extensive form games
Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games
Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Rationality and Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games