Arbeitspapier
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games
Mailaith, Samuelson, and Swinkels (1992) introduce the normal form information set. Normal form information sets capture situations in which players can make certain decisions as if they knew their opponents' had chosen from a particular subset of their strategies. In this paper, we say that an extensive form game represents a normal form game if, for each situation, the corresponding choice in the extnesive form is made with the player knowing that the opponents have chosen from the relevant subset. We show that normal form games exist that cannot be represented. We develop an algorithm that generates a representation whenever one exists and present a necessary and sufficient condition for a normal form game to be representable. Keywords: representation, extensive form game, normal form game, information set, extensive form--normal form equivalence. JEL Classification Numbers: C70, C72.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1041
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Mailath, George J.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
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1993
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Mailath, George J.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1993
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Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
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The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part II - Representation
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The theory of extensive form games
A category for extensive-form games
Consistent beliefs in extensive form games
Ellsberg games and the strategic use of ambiguity in normal and extensive form games
Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games
Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games
Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
The category of node-and-choice forms for extensive-form games
The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part II - Representation