Arbeitspapier
Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
Riedel and Sass (2013) propose a framework for normal form games where players can use imprecise probabilistic devices. We extend this strategic use of objective ambiguity to extensive form games. We show that with rectangularity of Ellsberg strategies we have dynamic consistency in the sense of Kuhn (1953): rectangular Ellsberg strategies are equivalent to Ellsberg behavior strategies. We provide an example for our result and define Ellsberg equilibrium in such extensive form Ellsberg games.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Papers ; No. 478
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Subject
-
knightian uncertainty in games
objective ambiguity
strategic ambiguity
extensive form Ellsberg games
Kuhn's theorem
rectangularity
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Sass, Linda
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (where)
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Bielefeld
- (when)
-
2013
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-26740884
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Sass, Linda
- Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Time of origin
- 2013
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Consistent beliefs in extensive form games
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Convergence of best response dynamics in extensive-form games
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