Arbeitspapier
Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Games with Unawareness
We extend Kuhn's Theorem to extensive games with unawareness. This extension is not entirely obvious: First, extensive games with non-trivial unawareness involve a forest of partially ordered game trees rather than just one game tree. An information set at a history in one tree may consist of histories in a less expressive tree. Consequently, perfect recall takes a more complicated form as players may also become aware of new actions during the play. Second, strategies can only be partially an object of ex-ante choice in games with unawareness. Finally, histories that a player may expect to reach with a strategy profile may not be the histories that actually occur with this strategy profile, requiring us to define appropriate notions of equivalence of strategies.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 17-6
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Subject
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perfect recall
mixed strategy
behavior strategy
unawareness
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Schipper, Burkhard C.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of California, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Davis, CA
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schipper, Burkhard C.
- University of California, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2017