Arbeitspapier

Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Games with Unawareness

We extend Kuhn's Theorem to extensive games with unawareness. This extension is not entirely obvious: First, extensive games with non-trivial unawareness involve a forest of partially ordered game trees rather than just one game tree. An information set at a history in one tree may consist of histories in a less expressive tree. Consequently, perfect recall takes a more complicated form as players may also become aware of new actions during the play. Second, strategies can only be partially an object of ex-ante choice in games with unawareness. Finally, histories that a player may expect to reach with a strategy profile may not be the histories that actually occur with this strategy profile, requiring us to define appropriate notions of equivalence of strategies.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 17-6

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
perfect recall
mixed strategy
behavior strategy
unawareness

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schipper, Burkhard C.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of California, Department of Economics
(where)
Davis, CA
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schipper, Burkhard C.
  • University of California, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2017

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