The distribution of talent across contests

Arbeitspapier

Do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most-able contestants? To what extent do contestants avoid competition? In this paper, we show, theoretically and empirically, that the distribution of abilities plays a crucial role in determining contest choice. Complete sorting exists only when the proportion of high-ability contestants is sufficiently small. As this proportion increases, high-ability contestants shy away from competition and sorting decreases, such that, reverse sorting becomes a possibility. We test our theoretical predictions with a large panel data set containing contest choice over twenty years. We use exogenous variation in the participation of highly-able competitors to provide empirical evidence for the relationship among prizes, competition, and sorting.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 789

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
• Thema: Contests ; Competition ; Sorting ; Incentives

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Azmat, Ghazala ; Möller, Marc
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
• (wo): London
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175226
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ