An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions

Artikel

We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We conduct an economic experiment using this model to investigate possible behavioral factors that may explain deviations from theoretical predictions. The main findings show that agents display rational behavior when forming coalitions, especially when they know that a large proportion of their opponents play myopic strategies from the outset. Over time, however, agents learn to behave more strategically and even more rationally, thus enabling agents to display more of the behavior predicted by the coalition formation model with farsighted agents.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1-32 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• Subject: coalition formation ; power accumulation ; self-enforcement ; experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Jandoc, Karl Robert L. ; Juarez, Ruben
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): MDPI
• (where): Basel
• (when): 2019

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g10030031
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/219254
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET