Arbeitspapier

Self-Enforcing Climate Coalitions for Farsighted Countries: Integrated Analysis of Heterogeneous Countries

This paper studies the formation of international climate coalitions by heterogeneous countries. Countries rationally predict the consequences of their membership decisions in climate negotiations. We offer an approach to characterise the equilibrium number of coalitions and their number of signatories independent of their heterogeneity, and we suggest a tractable algorithm to fully characterise the equilibrium. In a dynamic game analysis of a general equilibrium model of the economy integrated with climate dynamics, a grand climate coalition or multiple climate coalitions may form in equilibrium, but if the policymakers are patient, the number of signatories in all climate treaties is a Tribonacci number. Our results are robust to the possibility of renegotiation and investment in green technologies besides fossil fuels.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9768

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General
Thema
climate economics
international environmental agreements
coalition formation
heterogeneous countries
integrated assessment models

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Vosooghi, Sareh
Arvaniti, Maria
van der Ploeg, Rick
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Vosooghi, Sareh
  • Arvaniti, Maria
  • van der Ploeg, Rick
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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