Strategic Immigration Policies and Welfare in Heterogeneous Countries

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialised countries and immigrants that come from “the rest of the world”. The countries are distinguished on the basis of three parameters: population size, bias towards immigrants, and production complementarity between native population and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game where each country makes a strategic choice of its immigration quotas. We first show that our game admits a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium and then study the welfare implications of countries' choices. It turns out that a county with a higher degree of production complementarity and a higher level of tolerance towards immigrants would allow a larger immigration quota and achieve a higher welfare level. Our results call for coordinated and harmonised immigration policies that may improve the welfare of both countries.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2.2004

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; International Migration
• Subject: Immigration quotas ; Heterogeneity ; Production complementarity ; Welfare ; Policy Harmonisation ; Migrationspolitik ; Wohlfahrtsanalyse ; Theorie ; Industrieländer ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Fujita, Masahisa ; Weber, Shlomo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/117881
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET