Artikel
Stable international environmental agreements: Large coalitions that achieve little
A standard result of coalition formation games is that stable coalitions are very small if the coalition plays Nash vis-à-vis the rest of the world and if abatement costs are quadratic. It has been shown that larger coalitions and even the grand coalition are possible if the marginal abatement cost is concave. The paper confirms this result, but shows that abatement activities by large coalitions smaller than the grand coalition can be very small. This can be 'repaired' only by assuming that the marginal abatement cost curve changes its curvature extremely once the stable coalition has been reached.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1-7 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
climate change
coalition theory
international environmental agreements
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Rauscher, Michael
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
MDPI
- (where)
-
Basel
- (when)
-
2019
- DOI
-
doi:10.3390/g10040047
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Rauscher, Michael
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2019
Other Objects (12)
Stable coalitions
Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Building Climate Coalitions on Preferential Free Trade Agreements
Stable international environmental agreements: An analytical approach
Convex vNM–stable sets for a semi orthogonal game. Part I: epsilon–relevant coalitions
Convex vNM-stable sets for a semi orthogonal game. Part I: ε–relevant coalitions
Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem
Description logic for coalitions
Strategic Formation of Coalitions
Strategic Formation of Coalitions
Stable coalitions
Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Building Climate Coalitions on Preferential Free Trade Agreements
Stable international environmental agreements: An analytical approach
Convex vNM–stable sets for a semi orthogonal game. Part I: epsilon–relevant coalitions
Convex vNM-stable sets for a semi orthogonal game. Part I: ε–relevant coalitions
Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem
Description logic for coalitions
Strategic Formation of Coalitions
Strategic Formation of Coalitions
Stable coalitions
Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Building Climate Coalitions on Preferential Free Trade Agreements
Stable international environmental agreements: An analytical approach
Convex vNM–stable sets for a semi orthogonal game. Part I: epsilon–relevant coalitions
Convex vNM-stable sets for a semi orthogonal game. Part I: ε–relevant coalitions
Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem
Description logic for coalitions
Strategic Formation of Coalitions