- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
2153-0793
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
online resource.
- Erschienen in
-
Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions ; day:8 ; month:10 ; year:2022 ; pages:1-33
Dynamic games and applications ; (8.10.2022), 1-33
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s13235-022-00478-4
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023012210433790808383
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:39 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
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Beteiligte
- Fu, Jing
- Page, Frank H.
- Zigrand, Jean-Pierre
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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