Arbeitspapier
Quality Choice, Fixed Costs and Equilibrium in Models of Vertical Differentiation
I provide a full characterization of the quality choice in duopolies with vertical differentiation, without assuming ex-ante if the market is fully covered or not. This will allow to show that covered or uncovered market configurations are endogenous outcomes of firms' strategic interaction. To this purpose, I assume that firms are characterized by quadratic fixed costs of quality improvements and check whether pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with a corner solution always exist. Finally, my results are compared to the quality choice that maximizes the total surplus of the economy. I show that the welfaremaximizing choice of qualities does not have to be found in the same market configuration of the corresponding market equilibrium.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 437
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Alvisi, Matteo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
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Bologna
- (wann)
-
2000
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4861
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Alvisi, Matteo
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2000