Arbeitspapier

Quality Choice, Fixed Costs and Equilibrium in Models of Vertical Differentiation

I provide a full characterization of the quality choice in duopolies with vertical differentiation, without assuming ex-ante if the market is fully covered or not. This will allow to show that covered or uncovered market configurations are endogenous outcomes of firms' strategic interaction. To this purpose, I assume that firms are characterized by quadratic fixed costs of quality improvements and check whether pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with a corner solution always exist. Finally, my results are compared to the quality choice that maximizes the total surplus of the economy. I show that the welfaremaximizing choice of qualities does not have to be found in the same market configuration of the corresponding market equilibrium.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 437

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Alvisi, Matteo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(wo)
Bologna
(wann)
2000

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4861
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Alvisi, Matteo
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Entstanden

  • 2000

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