Stable roommates with narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing preferences
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
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1573-7454
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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online resource.
- Bibliographic citation
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Stable roommates with narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing preferences ; volume:34 ; number:2 ; day:11 ; month:9 ; year:2020 ; pages:1-29 ; date:10.2020
Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems ; 34, Heft 2 (11.9.2020), 1-29, 10.2020
- Creator
- Contributor
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SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1007/s10458-020-09470-x
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2020120800040551543907
- Rights
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
15.08.2025, 7:29 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Bredereck, Robert
- Chen, Jiehua
- Finnendahl, Ugo Paavo
- Niedermeier, Rolf
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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