Signaling under double-crossing preferences

Arbeitspapier

This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under doublecrossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where indifference curves of two types cross twice, so that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a particular form of pooling: there is a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they choose actions that are clustered in possibly non-monotonic ways, with a gap separating these two sets of types. We also provide an algorithm to establish equilibrium existence by construction under mild conditions.

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• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1103

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Analysis of Education
• Thema: single-crossing property ; double-crossing property ; counter-signaling ; pairwise pooling ; mass pooling

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Chen, Chia-hui ; Ishida, Junichiro ; Suen, Wing-chuen
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (wo): Osaka
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/234915