Social choice in large populations with single-peaked preferences

Arbeitspapier

An anonymous social choice function for a large atomless population maps cross-section distributions of preferences into outcomes. Because any one individual is too insignificant to affect these distributions, every anonymous social choice function is individually strategy- proof. However, not every anonymous social choice function is group strategy-proof. If the set of outcomes is linearly ordered and participants have single-peaked preferences, an anonymous social choice function is group strategy-proof if and only if it can be implemented by a mechanism involving binary votes between neighbouring outcomes with nondecreasing thresholds for "moving higher up". Such a mechanism can be interpreted as a version of Moulin's (1980) generalized median-voter mechanism for a large population.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2021/18

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Welfare Economics: General ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Public Goods
• Subject: Social choice ; large populations ; strategy proofness ; group strategy proofness ; single-peaked preferences

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Hellwig, Martin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/245981
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET