A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions

Artikel

The paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property, is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. The paper provides a justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favour of the Gul conjecture (\citet{barbsurvey}).

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 711-733 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• Subject: Random social choice functions ; strategy-proofness ; compromise ; single-peaked preferences

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Chatterji, Shurojit ; Sen, Arunava ; Zeng, Huaxia
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2016

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE1972
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150291
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET