Artikel
Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked
We consider allocation problemswith indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked. In this paper we identify the family of efficient, non-manipulable, consistent, and balanced solutions. We refer those solutions as Temporary Satisfaction Methods, that can be viewed as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called uniform rule.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2011 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 453-467 ; Heidelberg: Springer
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Subject
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allocation problem
indivisibilities
single-peaked preferences
priority standard
temporary satisfaction methods
Allokationseffizienz
Präferenztheorie
Unteilbarkeit
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Herrero, Carmen
Martínez, Ricardo
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Springer
- (where)
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Heidelberg
- (when)
-
2011
- DOI
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doi:10.1007/s13209-011-0046-7
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Herrero, Carmen
- Martínez, Ricardo
- Springer
Time of origin
- 2011
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