Artikel
Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
In this paper, we study the Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences. We show that, with at least three agents, Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. We examine the implementability of various social choice correspondences (SCCs) in this environment, and prove that some well-known SCCs are Maskin monotonic ( but they do not satisfy no-veto power) and hence Nash implementable.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 38-49 ; Basel: MDPI
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
Nash implementation
allocation problem
single-dipped preferences
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Doghmi, Ahmed
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
MDPI
- (wo)
-
Basel
- (wann)
-
2013
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g4010038
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Doghmi, Ahmed
- MDPI
Entstanden
- 2013
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