Arbeitspapier
Reelection Threshold Contracts in Politics
When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for reelection. Read my lips would turn into read my contracts. Reelection thresholds can be offered by politicians during campaigns and do not impair the liberal principle of free and anonymous elections in democracies.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 622
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
elections
incentive contracts
democracy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gersbach, Hans
Liessem, Verena
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gersbach, Hans
- Liessem, Verena
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2001
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